A condition for cooperation in a game on complex networks

Tomohiko Konno*

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

39 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

We study a condition of favoring cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma game on complex networks. There are two kinds of players: cooperators and defectors. Cooperators pay a benefit b to their neighbors at a cost c, whereas defectors only receive a benefit. The game is a death-birth process with weak selection. Although it has been widely thought that b/c>〈k〉 is a condition of favoring cooperation (Ohtsuki et al., 2006), we find that b/c>〈knn〉 is the condition. We also show that among three representative networks, namely, regular, random, and scale-free, a regular network favors cooperation the most, whereas a scale-free network favors cooperation the least. In an ideal scale-free network, cooperation is never realized. Whether or not the scale-free network and network heterogeneity favor cooperation depends on the details of the game, although it is occasionally believed that these favor cooperation irrespective of the game structure.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)224-233
ページ数10
ジャーナルJournal of Theoretical Biology
269
1
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2011 1 21
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 医学(全般)
  • 免疫学および微生物学(全般)
  • 生化学、遺伝学、分子生物学(全般)
  • 農業および生物科学(全般)
  • モデリングとシミュレーション
  • 統計学および確率
  • 応用数学

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