Radio-frequency (RF) retroreflector attack (RFRA) is an active electromagnetic side-channel attack that aims to leak the target’s internal signals by irradiating the targeted device with a radio wave, where an attacker has embedded a malicious circuit (RF retroreflector) in the device in advance. As the retroreflector consists of small and cheap electrical elements, such as a field-effect transistor (FET) chip and a wire that can work as a dipole antenna, the reflector can be embedded into various kinds of electric devices that carry unencrypted, sensitive information;, e.g., keyboard, display monitor, microphone, speaker, USB, and so on. Only a few studies have addressed the RFRA. However, they did not evaluate the conditions for a successful attack scientifically, and therefore, assessing the feasibility of the RFRA remains an open issue. In the present study, we aim to evaluate the conditions for a successful RFRA, empirically, through extensive experiments. Understanding attack limitations should help to develop effective countermeasures against it. In particular, as the conditions for a successful attack, we studied the distance between the attacker and the target, and the target signal frequencies. Through the extensive experiments, using off-the-shelf hardware, including software-defined radio (SDR) equipment, we revealed that the required conditions for a successful attack are (1) up to a 10-Mbps of a target signal and (2) up to a distance of 10 meters. We also demonstrated that a USB keyboard, using USB low-speed (1.5 Mbps), is attackable, and we succeeded to eavesdrop typing. We conclude that the RFRA threat is realistic.
|出版ステータス||Published - 2018|
|イベント||12th USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies, WOOT 2018, co-located with USENIX Security 2018 - Baltimore, United States|
継続期間: 2018 8月 13 → 2018 8月 14
|Conference||12th USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies, WOOT 2018, co-located with USENIX Security 2018|
|Period||18/8/13 → 18/8/14|
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- コンピュータ ネットワークおよび通信