A game-theoretic two-echelon model approach to strategy development of competitive ocean logistics in Thailand

Thisana Waripan, Junzo Watada

    研究成果: Chapter

    2 被引用数 (Scopus)

    抄録

    This paper deals with optimal decision methods under a cooperative situation of the two-echelon model among logistic service providers (LSPs) of Stackelberg structure. Assuming duopolistic shippers and oligopolistic forwarders, the shippers perform as a leader and declare their service to both the forwarders after determining their price and quantity independently under shippers' scheme. The objective of this study is to obtain the optimal strategies of exporters in the three types of rival game behaviours: Stackelberg, Collusion and Cournot, each of which provides the optimal decision for the duopolistic shippers and the oligopolistic forwarders in each scenario. The result of a real situation indicates that: (i) among three scenarios, the oligopolistic treatment of forwarders' actions shows that Stackelberg behaviour can carry out the maximum profit, and (ii) Collusion game can achieve the maximum profit for the shippers.

    本文言語English
    ホスト出版物のタイトルFrontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications
    ページ2050-2059
    ページ数10
    243
    DOI
    出版ステータスPublished - 2012

    出版物シリーズ

    名前Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications
    243
    ISSN(印刷版)09226389

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • 人工知能

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