A multi-item auction with budget-constrained bidders and price controls

Yu Zhou

研究成果: Article査読

抄録

We extend the multi-item auction model of Talman and Yang (2008) and Andersson et al. (2015) by considering both unit-demand bidders with budget constraints and price controls on bidding items. Due to these budget and price restrictions, a Walrasian equilibrium generally fails to exist. To achieve efficiency, we propose a rationed equilibrium whose allocation is in the core. We also construct an ascending auction to find the proposed rationed equilibrium in (pseudo-)polynomial time.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)76-79
ページ数4
ジャーナルEconomics Letters
155
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2017 6 1
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 財務
  • 経済学、計量経済学

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