A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites

研究成果: Article査読

2 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

We analyze the problem of a jury that must rank a set of contestants whose socially optimal ranking is common knowledge among jurors who may have friends among the contestants and may, therefore, be biased in their friends' favor. We show a natural mechanism that is finite and complete informational, with no simultaneous moves (i.e., it is solvable by backward induction), which implements the socially optimal ranking with subgame perfect equilibria.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)508-518
ページ数11
ジャーナルGames and Economic Behavior
87
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2014 9

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

フィンガープリント 「A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites」の研究トピックを掘り下げます。これらがまとまってユニークなフィンガープリントを構成します。

引用スタイル