A new basis and the Shapley value

Koji Yokote*, Yukihiko Funaki, Yoshio Kamijo

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

8 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

The purpose of this paper is to introduce a new basis of the set of all TU games. Shapley (1953) introduced the unanimity game in which cooperation of all players in a given coalition yields payoff. We introduce the commander game in which only one player in a given coalition yields payoff. The set of the commander games forms a basis and has two properties. First, when we express a game by a linear combination of the basis, the coefficients related to singletons coincide with the Shapley value. Second, the basis induces the null space of the Shapley value.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)21-24
ページ数4
ジャーナルMathematical social sciences
80
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2016 3月 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 社会学および政治科学
  • 社会科学(全般)
  • 心理学(全般)
  • 統計学、確率および不確実性

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