A sufficient condition for two-person ex post implementation in a general environment

Yoshihiro Ohashi

    研究成果: Article査読

    1 被引用数 (Scopus)

    抄録

    This paper establishes sufficient conditions for two-person ex post implementation of a social choice set in a general environment. A single social choice function is ex post implementable if it satisfies ex post incentive compatibility (EPIC) and ex post monotonicity no veto (EMNV) conditions. A general social choice set is ex post implementable if it satisfies another condition, intersection property (IP), in addition to the above.

    本文言語English
    ページ(範囲)63-68
    ページ数6
    ジャーナルMathematical Social Sciences
    69
    1
    DOI
    出版ステータスPublished - 2014

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
    • Social Sciences(all)
    • Psychology(all)
    • Sociology and Political Science

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