A sufficient condition for two-person ex post implementation in a general environment

Yoshihiro Ohashi

doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.02.002

A sufficient condition for two-person ex post implementation in a general environment

Yoshihiro Ohashi^*

^*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article › 査読

1 被引用数 (Scopus)

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This paper establishes sufficient conditions for two-person ex post implementation of a social choice set in a general environment. A single social choice function is ex post implementable if it satisfies ex post incentive compatibility (EPIC) and ex post monotonicity no veto (EMNV) conditions. A general social choice set is ex post implementable if it satisfies another condition, intersection property (IP), in addition to the above.

本文言語	English
ページ（範囲）	63-68
ページ数	6
ジャーナル	Mathematical Social Sciences
巻	69
号	1
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.02.002
出版ステータス	Published - 2014

ASJC Scopus subject areas

統計学、確率および不確実性
社会科学（全般）
心理学（全般）
社会学および政治科学

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10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.02.002

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A sufficient condition for two-person ex post implementation in a general environment

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