A two-step shapley value for cooperative games with coalition structures

Yoshio Kamijo*

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

41 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

In this paper, we study cooperative games with coalition structures. We show that a solution concept that applies the Shapley value to games among and within coalitions and in which the pure surplus that the coalition obtains is allocated among the intra-coalition members in an egalitarian way, is axiomatized by modified axioms on null players and symmetric players and the usual three axioms: efficiency, additivity and coalitional symmetry. In addition to the original definition, we give two expressions of this solution concept. One is an average of modified marginal contributions and the other is the weighted Shapley value of a game with restricted communication.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)207-214
ページ数8
ジャーナルInternational Game Theory Review
11
2
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2009 6月

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • ビジネスおよび国際経営
  • コンピュータ サイエンス(全般)
  • 統計学、確率および不確実性

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