AES key recovery based on Switching Distance model

Hongying Liu, Guoyu Qian, Satoshi Goto, Yukiyasu Tsunoo

研究成果: Conference contribution

2 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

As one of the effective side-channel attacks that threaten the security of cryptographic devices, Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attacks exploit the linear relation between the known power consumption and the predicted power consumption of cryptographic devices to recover keys. A robust cryptographic algorithm should endure both the cryptanalysis from software and hardware implementations. Researches have focused on the security examination of AES (Advanced Encryption Standard). In this paper, we present the CPA attack with the Switching Distance model against an AES implementation on ASIC. Compared with the leakage model of Hamming Distance, the power traces of recovering keys have been decreased by as much as 25%. These should cause more attention of security experts.

本文言語English
ホスト出版物のタイトル3rd International Symposium on Electronic Commerce and Security, ISECS 2010
ページ218-222
ページ数5
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2010
イベント3rd International Symposium on Electronic Commerce and Security, ISECS 2010 - Guangzhou
継続期間: 2010 7 292010 7 31

Other

Other3rd International Symposium on Electronic Commerce and Security, ISECS 2010
CityGuangzhou
Period10/7/2910/7/31

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 技術マネージメントおよび技術革新管理
  • マーケティング

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