An asymmetric option game in a duopolistic real estate market

Makoto Goto, Tomoaki Tabata, Takahiro Ono

研究成果: Article査読

抄録

This article deals with investment decision-making under uncertainty and competition. The traditional net present value (NPV) method doesn't consider the flexibility of decision-making, so project values tend to be underestimated. A. real options approach that can make up for the weak point of NPV has recently been the focus, but it considers only one agent, similar to the money market. However, in actual case, a competitor's decision-making is sure to influence the project value of the agent. Therefore, the influence of a competitor's decision-making must be estimated. Game theory is effective to optimize one's own actions subject to a competitor's decision-making (strategy). Therefore, the reduction in project value due to competition is formulated by applying game theory to a real options approach. The model should be solved so that the conditional expected value is maximized. We considered a duopolistic real estate market by referring Grenadier [1] in previous studies. While the previous study formulated two symmetric agents, we try to extend the model to two asymmetric agents. Asymmetry results in an asymmetric equilibrium exercise strategy. With this result, we are able to explain the economic phenomenon that previous studies couldn't explain. That is, a firm with superior development technology has an advantage over the firm with inferior technology. Furthermore, we indicate the change in decision-making caused by uncertainty and construction costs from comparative statistics.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)1-11
ページ数11
ジャーナルJournal of Japan Industrial Management Association
56
1
出版ステータスPublished - 2005

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 戦略と経営
  • 経営科学およびオペレーションズ リサーチ
  • 産業および生産工学
  • 応用数学

フィンガープリント

「An asymmetric option game in a duopolistic real estate market」の研究トピックを掘り下げます。これらがまとまってユニークなフィンガープリントを構成します。

引用スタイル