(A)symmetric information bubbles: Experimental evidence

Yasushi Asako*, Yukihiko Funaki, Kozo Ueda, Nobuyuki Uto

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

1 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

Asymmetric information has explained the existence of a bubble in extant theoretical models. This study experimentally analyzes traders’ choices with and without asymmetric information based on the riding-bubble model. We show that traders tend to hold a bubble asset for longer, thereby expanding the bubble in a market with symmetric, rather than asymmetric, information. However, when traders are more experienced, the size of the bubble decreases, in which case bubbles do not arise with symmetric information. By contrast, the size of the bubble is stable in a market with asymmetric information.

本文言語English
論文番号103744
ジャーナルJournal of Economic Dynamics and Control
110
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2020 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 経済学、計量経済学
  • 制御と最適化
  • 応用数学

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