Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games

René Van Den Brink, Yukihiko Funaki

研究成果: Article査読

53 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

A situation, in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (point-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. In this article we discuss a class of equal surplus sharing solutions consisting of all convex combinations of the CIS-value, the ENSC-value and the equal division solution. We provide several characterizations of this class of solutions on variable and fixed player set. Specifications of several properties characterize specific solutions in this class.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)303-340
ページ数38
ジャーナルTheory and Decision
67
3
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2009 9

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 決定科学(全般)
  • 発達心理学および教育心理学
  • 人文科学(その他)
  • 応用心理学
  • 社会科学(全般)
  • 経済学、計量経済学および金融学(全般)
  • コンピュータ サイエンスの応用

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