@article{13292cbd16b34236a93ab2a354fff534,
title = "Barter for price discrimination",
abstract = "We study barter as a discriminatory instrument in oligopoly with asymmetric information. Buyers (producers of final goods) differ in the quality of their products. Sellers (producers of inputs) use barter as a screening device: the higher quality buyers pay in cash while the lower quality ones pay in kind. Barter, identified with non-monetary contracts that give a seller control over a buyer's output, emerges in equilibrium even in the absence of financial constraints. There is a positive relationship between market concentration and the level of barter. Barter disappears as the market becomes more competitive. Barter and no-barter equilibria coexist for a range of market structures.",
keywords = "Barter, Oligopoly, Price discrimination",
author = "Sergei Guriev and Dmitri Kvassov",
note = "Funding Information: This work was part of the Research Project “Non-Monetary Transactions in Russian Economy” carried out in the New Economic School Research Center with the financial support from Ford Foundation. We thank Sergei Golovan for the excellent research assistance. We thank Evgenia Bessonova, David Brown and Serguei Tsoukhlo for providing data. We are grateful to Barry Ickes, Yulia Kossykh, Stephen Martin, Mathilde Maurel, Dominique Redor, Andrei Sarychev, Mark Schaffer, Judith Shapiro, Giovanni Urga, Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, and two anonymous referees, participants of the GET conference, WDI-CEPR Annual Conference on Transition Economics, the World Congress of the Econometric Society, EARIE 2001, seminar participants at NES, RECEP and ROSES, and colleagues at NES and CEFIR for the helpful comments. ",
year = "2004",
month = mar,
doi = "10.1016/j.ijindorg.2003.09.003",
language = "English",
volume = "22",
pages = "329--350",
journal = "International Journal of Industrial Organization",
issn = "0167-7187",
publisher = "Elsevier Inc.",
number = "3",
}