Barter for price discrimination

Sergei Guriev, Dmitriy Kvasov

研究成果: Article

5 引用 (Scopus)

抄録

We study barter as a discriminatory instrument in oligopoly with asymmetric information. Buyers (producers of final goods) differ in the quality of their products. Sellers (producers of inputs) use barter as a screening device: the higher quality buyers pay in cash while the lower quality ones pay in kind. Barter, identified with non-monetary contracts that give a seller control over a buyer's output, emerges in equilibrium even in the absence of financial constraints. There is a positive relationship between market concentration and the level of barter. Barter disappears as the market becomes more competitive. Barter and no-barter equilibria coexist for a range of market structures.

元の言語English
ページ(範囲)329-350
ページ数22
ジャーナルInternational Journal of Industrial Organization
22
発行部数3
DOI
出版物ステータスPublished - 2004 3
外部発表Yes

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Screening
Barter
Price discrimination
Buyers
Seller

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Industrial relations
  • Aerospace Engineering
  • Strategy and Management
  • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering

これを引用

Barter for price discrimination. / Guriev, Sergei; Kvasov, Dmitriy.

:: International Journal of Industrial Organization, 巻 22, 番号 3, 03.2004, p. 329-350.

研究成果: Article

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