Barter for price discrimination

Sergei Guriev, Dmitri Kvassov

研究成果: Article

6 引用 (Scopus)

抜粋

We study barter as a discriminatory instrument in oligopoly with asymmetric information. Buyers (producers of final goods) differ in the quality of their products. Sellers (producers of inputs) use barter as a screening device: the higher quality buyers pay in cash while the lower quality ones pay in kind. Barter, identified with non-monetary contracts that give a seller control over a buyer's output, emerges in equilibrium even in the absence of financial constraints. There is a positive relationship between market concentration and the level of barter. Barter disappears as the market becomes more competitive. Barter and no-barter equilibria coexist for a range of market structures.

元の言語English
ページ(範囲)329-350
ページ数22
ジャーナルInternational Journal of Industrial Organization
22
発行部数3
DOI
出版物ステータスPublished - 2004 3 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Industrial relations
  • Aerospace Engineering
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
  • Strategy and Management
  • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering

フィンガープリント Barter for price discrimination' の研究トピックを掘り下げます。これらはともに一意のフィンガープリントを構成します。

  • これを引用