抄録
We study barter as a discriminatory instrument in oligopoly with asymmetric information. Buyers (producers of final goods) differ in the quality of their products. Sellers (producers of inputs) use barter as a screening device: the higher quality buyers pay in cash while the lower quality ones pay in kind. Barter, identified with non-monetary contracts that give a seller control over a buyer's output, emerges in equilibrium even in the absence of financial constraints. There is a positive relationship between market concentration and the level of barter. Barter disappears as the market becomes more competitive. Barter and no-barter equilibria coexist for a range of market structures.
| 元の言語 | English |
|---|---|
| ページ（範囲） | 329-350 |
| ページ数 | 22 |
| ジャーナル | International Journal of Industrial Organization |
| 巻 | 22 |
| 発行部数 | 3 |
| DOI | |
| 出版物ステータス | Published - 2004 3 |
| 外部発表 | Yes |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Industrial relations
- Aerospace Engineering
- Strategy and Management
- Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
これを引用
Barter for price discrimination. / Guriev, Sergei; Kvasov, Dmitriy.
：: International Journal of Industrial Organization, 巻 22, 番号 3, 03.2004, p. 329-350.研究成果: Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Barter for price discrimination
AU - Guriev, Sergei
AU - Kvasov, Dmitriy
PY - 2004/3
Y1 - 2004/3
N2 - We study barter as a discriminatory instrument in oligopoly with asymmetric information. Buyers (producers of final goods) differ in the quality of their products. Sellers (producers of inputs) use barter as a screening device: the higher quality buyers pay in cash while the lower quality ones pay in kind. Barter, identified with non-monetary contracts that give a seller control over a buyer's output, emerges in equilibrium even in the absence of financial constraints. There is a positive relationship between market concentration and the level of barter. Barter disappears as the market becomes more competitive. Barter and no-barter equilibria coexist for a range of market structures.
AB - We study barter as a discriminatory instrument in oligopoly with asymmetric information. Buyers (producers of final goods) differ in the quality of their products. Sellers (producers of inputs) use barter as a screening device: the higher quality buyers pay in cash while the lower quality ones pay in kind. Barter, identified with non-monetary contracts that give a seller control over a buyer's output, emerges in equilibrium even in the absence of financial constraints. There is a positive relationship between market concentration and the level of barter. Barter disappears as the market becomes more competitive. Barter and no-barter equilibria coexist for a range of market structures.
KW - Barter
KW - Oligopoly
KW - Price discrimination
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=1242264795&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=1242264795&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2003.09.003
DO - 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2003.09.003
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:1242264795
VL - 22
SP - 329
EP - 350
JO - International Journal of Industrial Organization
JF - International Journal of Industrial Organization
SN - 0167-7187
IS - 3
ER -