Barter for price discrimination

Sergei Guriev*, Dmitri Kvassov

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

9 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

We study barter as a discriminatory instrument in oligopoly with asymmetric information. Buyers (producers of final goods) differ in the quality of their products. Sellers (producers of inputs) use barter as a screening device: the higher quality buyers pay in cash while the lower quality ones pay in kind. Barter, identified with non-monetary contracts that give a seller control over a buyer's output, emerges in equilibrium even in the absence of financial constraints. There is a positive relationship between market concentration and the level of barter. Barter disappears as the market becomes more competitive. Barter and no-barter equilibria coexist for a range of market structures.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)329-350
ページ数22
ジャーナルInternational Journal of Industrial Organization
22
3
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2004 3月
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 労使関係
  • 航空宇宙工学
  • 経済学、計量経済学
  • 経済学、計量経済学および金融学(その他)
  • 戦略と経営
  • 産業および生産工学

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