Bidding behaviors for a keyword auction in a sealed-bid environment

Y. Kamijo*

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

9 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

A keyword auction is conducted by Internet search engines to sell advertising slots listed on the search results page. Although much of the literature assumes the dynamic bidding strategy that utilizes the current bids of other advertisers, such information is, in practice, not available for participants in the auction. This paper explores the bidding behavior of advertisers in a sealed-bid environment, where each bidder does not know the current bids of others. This study considers secure bidding with a trial bid (SBT) as the bid adjustment process used by the advertisers, which is functional in a sealed-bid environment. It is shown that the SBT bid adjustment process converges to some equilibrium point in a one-shot game irrespective of the initial bid profile. Simulation results verify that a sealed-bid environment would be beneficial to search engines.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)371-378
ページ数8
ジャーナルDecision Support Systems
56
1
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2013 12月
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 管理情報システム
  • 情報システム
  • 発達心理学および教育心理学
  • 人文科学(その他)
  • 情報システムおよび情報管理

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