Can partisan voting lead to truth?

Naoki Masuda*, S. Redner

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

21 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

We study an extension of the voter model in which each agent is endowed with an innate preference for one of two states that we term as 'truth' or 'falsehood'. Due to interactions with neighbors, an agent that innately prefers truth can be persuaded to adopt a false opinion (and thus be discordant with its innate preference) or the agent can possess an internally concordant 'true' opinion. Parallel states exist for agents that inherently prefer falsehood. We determine the conditions under which a population of such agents can ultimately reach a consensus for the truth, reach a consensus for falsehood, or reach an impasse where an agent tends to adopt the opinion that is in internal concordance with its innate preference with the outcome that consensus is never achieved.

本文言語English
論文番号L02002
ジャーナルJournal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment
2011
2
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2011 2
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 統計物理学および非線形物理学
  • 統計学および確率
  • 統計学、確率および不確実性

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