Choosing a common project: Experimental evidence on the multibidding mechanism

David Pérez-Castrillo*, Róbert F. Veszteg

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

8 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

[Pérez-Castrillo, D., Wettstein, D., 2002. Choosing wisely: a multibidding approach. American Economic Review 5, 1577-1587.] and [Veszteg, R.F., 2004. Multibidding game under uncertainty. Working paper 14/04. Universidad de Navarra.] propose the use of a multibidding mechanism for situations where agents have to choose a common project. Examples are decisions involving public goods (or public "bads"). We report experimental results that test the practical tractability and effectiveness of multibidding mechanisms in environments where agents hold private information concerning their valuation of the projects. The mechanism performed quite well in the laboratory, providing the ex post efficient outcome in roughly three quarters of the cases across the treatments; moreover, the largest part of the subject pool formed their bids according to theoretical bidding behavior.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)394-411
ページ数18
ジャーナルJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
63
3
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2007 7月
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 経済学、計量経済学
  • 組織的行動および人的資源管理

フィンガープリント

「Choosing a common project: Experimental evidence on the multibidding mechanism」の研究トピックを掘り下げます。これらがまとまってユニークなフィンガープリントを構成します。

引用スタイル