Choosing a common project: Experimental evidence on the multibidding mechanism

David Pérez-Castrillo, Róbert F. Veszteg

研究成果: Article

8 引用 (Scopus)

抜粋

[Pérez-Castrillo, D., Wettstein, D., 2002. Choosing wisely: a multibidding approach. American Economic Review 5, 1577-1587.] and [Veszteg, R.F., 2004. Multibidding game under uncertainty. Working paper 14/04. Universidad de Navarra.] propose the use of a multibidding mechanism for situations where agents have to choose a common project. Examples are decisions involving public goods (or public "bads"). We report experimental results that test the practical tractability and effectiveness of multibidding mechanisms in environments where agents hold private information concerning their valuation of the projects. The mechanism performed quite well in the laboratory, providing the ex post efficient outcome in roughly three quarters of the cases across the treatments; moreover, the largest part of the subject pool formed their bids according to theoretical bidding behavior.

元の言語English
ページ(範囲)394-411
ページ数18
ジャーナルJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
63
発行部数3
DOI
出版物ステータスPublished - 2007 7 1
外部発表Yes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

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