Coalitions, Incentives, and Risk Sharing

Hideshi Itoh*

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

103 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

This paper analyzes the effects of coalitional behavior in principal-multiagent relationships with moral hazard and identifies cases where the principal prefers agents to form a coalition via side contracting. It is shown that the principal can implement given efforts, via non-individualistic incentive contracts, at a lower cost when the agents can monitor each other’s efforts perfectly and hence coordinate their effort choice than when the agents behave independently. Permitting the principal to utilize more complex communication mechanisms does not alter the result, for there is no coalition-proof revelation mechanism improving the principal’s welfare. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D82.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)410-427
ページ数18
ジャーナルJournal of Economic Theory
60
2
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 1993 8
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 経済学、計量経済学

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