College admissions and the role of information: An experimental study

Joana Pais, Ágnes Pintér, Róbert F. Veszteg*

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

17 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

Three well-known matching mechanisms designed to solve the college admissions problems are analyzed in the experimental laboratory in different informational settings. We observe that when the level of information is significantly increased, the proportion of schools and teachers that submit their true preferences decreases. This affects largely the efficiency and stability of the Gale-Shapley and the Boston mechanisms. The TTC mechanism is less sensitive to information and outperforms the other two mechanisms in terms of efficiency and stability, and it is as successful as them in extracting private information.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)713-737
ページ数25
ジャーナルInternational Economic Review
52
3
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2011 8月
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 経済学、計量経済学

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