College admissions and the role of information

An experimental study

Joana Pais, Ágnes Pintér, Robert Ferenc Veszteg

研究成果: Article

8 引用 (Scopus)

抄録

Three well-known matching mechanisms designed to solve the college admissions problems are analyzed in the experimental laboratory in different informational settings. We observe that when the level of information is significantly increased, the proportion of schools and teachers that submit their true preferences decreases. This affects largely the efficiency and stability of the Gale-Shapley and the Boston mechanisms. The TTC mechanism is less sensitive to information and outperforms the other two mechanisms in terms of efficiency and stability, and it is as successful as them in extracting private information.

元の言語English
ページ(範囲)713-737
ページ数25
ジャーナルInternational Economic Review
52
発行部数3
DOI
出版物ステータスPublished - 2011 8
外部発表Yes

Fingerprint

Experimental study
College admissions
Proportion
Boston mechanism
Private information

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

これを引用

College admissions and the role of information : An experimental study. / Pais, Joana; Pintér, Ágnes; Veszteg, Robert Ferenc.

:: International Economic Review, 巻 52, 番号 3, 08.2011, p. 713-737.

研究成果: Article

@article{03064cadc1394be7b899149ffb392028,
title = "College admissions and the role of information: An experimental study",
abstract = "Three well-known matching mechanisms designed to solve the college admissions problems are analyzed in the experimental laboratory in different informational settings. We observe that when the level of information is significantly increased, the proportion of schools and teachers that submit their true preferences decreases. This affects largely the efficiency and stability of the Gale-Shapley and the Boston mechanisms. The TTC mechanism is less sensitive to information and outperforms the other two mechanisms in terms of efficiency and stability, and it is as successful as them in extracting private information.",
author = "Joana Pais and {\'A}gnes Pint{\'e}r and Veszteg, {Robert Ferenc}",
year = "2011",
month = "8",
doi = "10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00647.x",
language = "English",
volume = "52",
pages = "713--737",
journal = "International Economic Review",
issn = "0020-6598",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "3",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - College admissions and the role of information

T2 - An experimental study

AU - Pais, Joana

AU - Pintér, Ágnes

AU - Veszteg, Robert Ferenc

PY - 2011/8

Y1 - 2011/8

N2 - Three well-known matching mechanisms designed to solve the college admissions problems are analyzed in the experimental laboratory in different informational settings. We observe that when the level of information is significantly increased, the proportion of schools and teachers that submit their true preferences decreases. This affects largely the efficiency and stability of the Gale-Shapley and the Boston mechanisms. The TTC mechanism is less sensitive to information and outperforms the other two mechanisms in terms of efficiency and stability, and it is as successful as them in extracting private information.

AB - Three well-known matching mechanisms designed to solve the college admissions problems are analyzed in the experimental laboratory in different informational settings. We observe that when the level of information is significantly increased, the proportion of schools and teachers that submit their true preferences decreases. This affects largely the efficiency and stability of the Gale-Shapley and the Boston mechanisms. The TTC mechanism is less sensitive to information and outperforms the other two mechanisms in terms of efficiency and stability, and it is as successful as them in extracting private information.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=80052257027&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=80052257027&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00647.x

DO - 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00647.x

M3 - Article

VL - 52

SP - 713

EP - 737

JO - International Economic Review

JF - International Economic Review

SN - 0020-6598

IS - 3

ER -