Compromising between the proportional and equal division values

Zhengxing Zou*, René van den Brink, Yukihiko Funaki

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

抄録

We introduce a family of values for TU-games that offers a compromise between the proportional and equal division values. Each value, called an α-mollified value, is obtained in two steps. First, linear functions are defined that associate a real number to every TU-game. Second, the weight assigned by this function is used to weigh proportionality and equality principles in allocating the worth of the grand coalition. We provide an axiomatic characterization of this family, and show that this family contains the affine combinations of the equal division value and the equal surplus division value as the only linear values. Further, we identify the proportional division value and the affine combinations of the equal division value and the equal surplus division value as those members of this family, that satisfy projection consistency.

本文言語English
論文番号102539
ジャーナルJournal of Mathematical Economics
DOI
出版ステータスAccepted/In press - 2021

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 経済学、計量経済学
  • 応用数学

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