Confidence and competence in communication

Kohei Kawamura*

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

1 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

This paper studies information transmission between an uninformed decision maker (receiver) and an informed agent (sender) who have asymmetric beliefs (“confidence”) on the sender’s ability (“competence”) to observe the state of nature. We find that even when the material payoffs of the players are perfectly aligned, the sender’s over- and underconfidence on his information give rise to information loss in communication, although they do not by themselves completely eliminate information transmission in equilibrium. However, an underconfident sender may prefer no communication to informative communication. We also show that when the sender is biased, overconfidence can lead to more information transmission and welfare improvement.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)233-259
ページ数27
ジャーナルTheory and Decision
78
2
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2014 2
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 決定科学(全般)
  • 発達心理学および教育心理学
  • 人文科学(その他)
  • 応用心理学
  • 社会科学(全般)
  • 経済学、計量経済学および金融学(全般)
  • コンピュータ サイエンスの応用

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