Conflict, interpersonal assessment, and the evolution of cooperation: Simulation results

James Hanley, John Orbell, Tomonori Morikawa

研究成果: Chapter

4 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

How cooperative dispositions might have evolved among social animals has, for many years, been productively addressed within the prisoner's dilemma paradigm. That game captures the intuition that by cooperating, individuals can often produce more than is possible by their separate efforts and also that self-interest can lead individuals to undermine their cooperative efforts. The structure is robust, with only minor elaborations necessary to show how populations can realize their cooperative opportunities. The best-known such elaboration is iteration of the game; simply requiring players to interact in a sequence of prisoner's dilemmas can lead them to adopt cooperation-inducing strategies such as tit-for-tat (see, for example, Axelrod 1984; Nowak and Sigmund 1992) and winstay, lose-shift (Nowak and Sigmund 1993, see also Schuessler 1989 and Vanberg and Congleton 1992).

本文言語English
ホスト出版物のタイトルTrust and Reciprocity
ホスト出版物のサブタイトルInterdisciplinary Lessons from Experimental Research
出版社Russell Sage Foundation
ページ170-206
ページ数37
9781610444347
ISBN(電子版)9781610444347
ISBN(印刷版)9780871546470
出版ステータスPublished - 2003 1 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences(all)

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