Consistency and monotonicity in assignment problems

Hiroo Sasaki*

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

23 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

This paper presents axiomatic characterizations of the core of assignment problems. In the main axiomatization theorem we use six axioms including the consistency (CONS) and the weak pairwise-monotonicity (W.P.MON) which are firstly proposed and defined for this setup in the present paper. Since an assignment problem may be converted into a model of a private ownership economy with indivisible goods and the core of the assignment problem coincides with the set of the competitive allocations of the economy, our characterization theorems also give axiomatic characterizations of the set of competitive allocations. Because the consistency is a desirable property of resource allocation mechanisms, our main result gives a new normative implication of competitive equilibria.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)373-397
ページ数25
ジャーナルInternational Journal of Game Theory
24
4
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 1995 12 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 統計学および確率
  • 数学(その他)
  • 社会科学(その他)
  • 経済学、計量経済学
  • 統計学、確率および不確実性

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