Consistency and monotonicity in assignment problems

研究成果: Article

22 引用 (Scopus)

抄録

This paper presents axiomatic characterizations of the core of assignment problems. In the main axiomatization theorem we use six axioms including the consistency (CONS) and the weak pairwise-monotonicity (W.P.MON) which are firstly proposed and defined for this setup in the present paper. Since an assignment problem may be converted into a model of a private ownership economy with indivisible goods and the core of the assignment problem coincides with the set of the competitive allocations of the economy, our characterization theorems also give axiomatic characterizations of the set of competitive allocations. Because the consistency is a desirable property of resource allocation mechanisms, our main result gives a new normative implication of competitive equilibria.

元の言語English
ページ(範囲)373-397
ページ数25
ジャーナルInternational Journal of Game Theory
24
発行部数4
DOI
出版物ステータスPublished - 1995 12

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Assignment Problem
Monotonicity
axiomatization
Competitive Equilibrium
Indivisible
economy
Characterization Theorem
Axiomatization
Resource Allocation
Axioms
Pairwise
Theorem
resources
Assignment problem
Axiomatic characterization
Model

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics

これを引用

Consistency and monotonicity in assignment problems. / Sasaki, Hiroo.

:: International Journal of Game Theory, 巻 24, 番号 4, 12.1995, p. 373-397.

研究成果: Article

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