Consistency of the doctor-optimal equilibrium price vector in job-matching markets

研究成果: Article査読

抄録

In a many-to-many variation of Kelso and Crawford's (1982) and Kojima et al.'s (2019) job-matching model, we prove that the doctor-optimal equilibrium price vector satisfies a striking property termed consistency. It states that the price vector remains an equilibrium price vector in the market where an arbitrary doctor reduces her capacity by one. Combining consistency with Kojima et al.'s (2019) result, we delineate how the set of equilibrium price vectors moves when a doctor reduces her capacity by one: the set moves up but still contains the original doctor-optimal equilibrium price vector. We apply this result to establish comparative statics of welfare at equilibrium. As a byproduct, we also provide a simple and short proof of the claim that the doctor-optimal stable mechanism is a pivotal mechanism under quasi-linear preferences.

本文言語English
論文番号105346
ジャーナルJournal of Economic Theory
197
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2021 10
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 経済学、計量経済学

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