Consistency, population solidarity, and egalitarian solutions for TU-games

René van den Brink, Youngsub Chun, Yukihiko Funaki, Boram Park

研究成果: Article

15 引用 (Scopus)

抜粋

A (point-valued) solution for cooperative games with transferable utility, or simply TU-games, assigns a payoff vector to every TU-game. In this paper we discuss two classes of equal surplus sharing solutions. The first class consists of all convex combinations of the equal division solution (which allocates the worth of the ‘grand coalition’ consisting of all players equally over all players) and the center-of-gravity of the imputation-set value (which first assigns every player its singleton worth and then allocates the remainder of the worth of the grand coalition, N, equally over all players). The second class is the dual class consisting of all convex combinations of the equal division solution and the egalitarian non-separable contribution value (which first assigns every player its contribution to the ‘grand coalition’ and then allocates the remainder equally over all players). We provide characterizations of the two classes of solutions using either population solidarity or a reduced game consistency in addition to other standard properties.

元の言語English
ページ(範囲)427-447
ページ数21
ジャーナルTheory and Decision
81
発行部数3
DOI
出版物ステータスPublished - 2016 9 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Decision Sciences(all)
  • Developmental and Educational Psychology
  • Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
  • Applied Psychology
  • Social Sciences(all)
  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
  • Computer Science Applications

フィンガープリント Consistency, population solidarity, and egalitarian solutions for TU-games' の研究トピックを掘り下げます。これらはともに一意のフィンガープリントを構成します。

  • これを引用