Contests with limited resources

Dmitriy Kvasov*

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

61 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

Many interesting phenomena (electoral competition, R&D races, lobbying) are instances of multiple simultaneous contests with unconditional commitment of limited resources. Specifically, the following game is analyzed. Two players compete in a number of simultaneous contests. The players have limited resources (budgets) and must decide how to allocate these to the different contests. In each contest the player who expends more resources than his adversary wins a corresponding prize. Mixed-strategy equilibria are characterized in the case of identical values and budgets and the connections with the classical Blotto game are analyzed.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)738-748
ページ数11
ジャーナルJournal of Economic Theory
136
1
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2007 9
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 経済学、計量経済学

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