Continuum economies with finite coalitions: Core, equilibria, and widespread externalities

Peter J. Hammond*, Mamoru Kaneko, Myrna Holtz Wooders

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

41 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

We develop a new model of a continuum economy with coalitions consisting of only finite numbers of agents. The core, called the f-core, is the set of allocations that are stable against improvement by finite coalitions and feasible by trade within finite coalitions. Even with widespread externalities-preferences depend on own consumptions and also on the entire allocation up to the null set-we obtain the result that the f-core coincides with the Walrasian allocations. Without widespread externalities, the f-core, the Aumann core, and the Walrasian allocations all coincide; however, with widespread externalities there is no obvious natural definition of the Aumann core.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)113-134
ページ数22
ジャーナルJournal of Economic Theory
49
1
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 1989
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 経済学、計量経済学

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