In this chapter, limited access order (LAO) and open access order (OAO) are used as a conceptual framework for analyzing two peacebuilding cases in Southeast Asia: the Philippines (Mindanao) and Myanmar. The main hypothesis is that the national dominant coalition (NDC) relies on patron–client relationships between national elites and their counterparts in subsidiary communities to control violence in LAOs. The chapter examines the importance of the three key doorstep conditions—the rule of law for elites, perpetually lived organizations in the public and private spheres, and consolidated political control of the organizations with violent capacity—for establishing control of the violence within the territory in these two cases. The chapter suggests that violence is more likely to be controlled when national elites can find it to their advantage to limit violence and make sustained social interaction possible in order to preserve their privileges and vested interests. The two case studies also demonstrate that “rents” (material benefits that the elites use to forge a consensus or to maintain the coalition among them) are used to limit violence and to coordinate the interests of powerful individuals and organizations.