Cores of partitioning games

Mamoru Kaneko, Myrna Holtz Wooders

研究成果: Article査読

94 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

A generalization of assignment games, called partitioning games, is introduced. Given a finite set N of players, there is an a priori given set π of coalitions of N and only coalitions in π play an essential role. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the nonemptiness of the cores of all games with essential coalitions π are developed. These conditions appear extremely restrictive. However when N is 'large', there are relatively few 'types' of players, and members of π are 'small' and defined in terms of numbers of players of each type contained in subsets, then approximate cores are nonempty.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)313-327
ページ数15
ジャーナルMathematical Social Sciences
3
4
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 1982
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 統計学、確率および不確実性
  • 経済学、計量経済学

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