Correction to: Power-sharing negotiation and commitment in monarchies (Public Choice, (2021), 187, 3-4, (501-518), 10.1007/s11127-020-00792-8)

Kana Inata*

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Comment/debate査読

抄録

My article (Inata, 2021) derives a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in a simple game to analyze power-sharing negotiation and commitment problems between an absolute monarch and the regime’s elites. This equilibrium is, however, not unique, strictly speaking; while it is effectively unique in a behavioral sense because it generates the unique outcomes, it does not rule out all best-reply strategies. The article’s conclusion about the role played by the public nevertheless remains intact. For interested readers, I will detail those equilibria in this correction.

本文言語English
ジャーナルPublic Choice
DOI
出版ステータスAccepted/In press - 2021
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 社会学および政治科学
  • 経済学、計量経済学

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