Designing division of labor with strategic uncertainty within organizations: Model analysis and a behavioral experiment

Yoshio Kamijo, Daisuke Nakama*

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

抄録

For managers who are responsible for designing the division of labor, there are prototypes such as the divisional and functional designs, but insufficient knowledge of what to consider when selecting them. To address this shortfall, we developed a multiple economic game model with a two-step structure to examine the strategic interdependence between the two prototypes. We analyzed the model from three different perspectives: a traditional analysis, an equilibrium analysis, and a behavioral analysis followed by a laboratory experiment. While the first analysis revealed that the functional design would outperform divisional design when individual decisions are exogenous, the game theoretic equilibrium analysis demonstrated that the two prototype designs have similar equilibria when individuals are rational. However, assuming that individuals made autonomous decisions with accessible information under given organizational structures, behavioral analysis derived predictions that the divisional design was more likely to produce favorable consequences than the functional design. This prediction was confirmed by the economic experiment in the laboratory. These results imply that the strategic uncertainty within organizations differs according to the designs and affects organizational consequences.

本文言語English
ジャーナルJournal of Economics and Management Strategy
DOI
出版ステータスAccepted/In press - 2022

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • ビジネス、管理および会計(全般)
  • 経済学、計量経済学
  • 戦略と経営
  • 技術マネージメントおよび技術革新管理

フィンガープリント

「Designing division of labor with strategic uncertainty within organizations: Model analysis and a behavioral experiment」の研究トピックを掘り下げます。これらがまとまってユニークなフィンガープリントを構成します。

引用スタイル