Directional equilibria

Hun Chung, John Duggan*

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

5 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

We propose the solution concept of directional equilibrium for the multidimensional model of voting with general spatial preferences. This concept isolates alternatives that are stable with respect to forces applied by all voters in the directions of their gradients, and it extends a known concept from statistics for Euclidean preferences. We establish connections to the majority core, Pareto optimality, and existence and closed graph, and we provide non-cooperative foundations in terms of a local contest game played by voters.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)272-305
ページ数34
ジャーナルJournal of Theoretical Politics
30
3
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2018 7月 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 社会学および政治科学

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