Does venture capital syndication affect mergers and acquisitions?

Giang Nguyen*, Le Vu

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

3 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

We find that venture capital (VC) syndicate-backed targets receive higher acquisition premiums and spend more time negotiating transaction terms. The acquirers of syndicate-backed targets receive lower cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the acquisition announcement, but they outperform the individual-backed targets in the long-term. We show that VC syndication creates value for entrepreneurial firms by leading to larger and more independent boards of directors prior to acquisition. It also leads to better incentive alignment between the CEO and the shareholders of the acquiring firm. In addition, syndicate-backed targets prefer stock as the method of payment in mergers and acquisitions. Collectively, we show that VC syndication creates value for both entrepreneurial firms and their acquirers in the long-term.

本文言語English
論文番号101851
ジャーナルJournal of Corporate Finance
67
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2021 4

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • ビジネスおよび国際経営
  • 財務
  • 経済学、計量経済学
  • 戦略と経営

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