Duopoly price competition in secondary spectrum markets

Xianwei Li, Bo Gu, Cheng Zhang, Zhi Liu, Kyoko Yamori, Yoshiaki Tanaka

研究成果: Conference contribution

1 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

In this paper, we consider the problem of spectrum sharing in a Cognitive Radio Network (CRN) with spectrum holder, two secondary operators and secondary users (SUs). In the system model under consideration, the spectrum allocated to the two secondary operators can be shared by SUs, which means that secondary operators buy spectrum from spectrum holder and then sell spectrum access service to SUs. We model the relationship between secondary operators and SUs as a two-stage stackelberg game, where secondary operators make spectrum channel quality and price decisions in the first stage, and then the SUs make their spectrum demands decisions. The backward induction method is employed to solve the stackelberg game. Numerical results are performed to evaluate our analysis.

本文言語English
ホスト出版物のタイトル2017 13th International Conference on Network and Service Management, CNSM 2017
出版社Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ページ1-5
ページ数5
ISBN(電子版)9783901882982
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2017 7 1
イベント13th International Conference on Network and Service Management, CNSM 2017 - Tokyo, Japan
継続期間: 2017 11 262017 11 30

出版物シリーズ

名前2017 13th International Conference on Network and Service Management, CNSM 2017
2018-January

Other

Other13th International Conference on Network and Service Management, CNSM 2017
CountryJapan
CityTokyo
Period17/11/2617/11/30

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Information Systems and Management
  • Control and Optimization
  • Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality

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