We consider a dynamic game model of power networks with generators and/or consumers, called agents, and one public commission, called utility. A game with a prescribed dynamic mechanism is performed such that each agent decides private control to minimize his own cost functional, and the utility decides prices to minimize a public cost functional and manages information transmissions. The model of this paper is a generic linear Gaussian model of power networks in which each agent has a type parameter with one's private information. In this setting, inspired by the incentive cost in the mechanism design theory from economics, we discuss designs of a mechanism that integrates strategic determinations of private controls by the rational agents into optimal public control that achieve social welfare maximization, Bayesian incentive compatibility and budget balance. Two dynamic balanced integration mechanisms are proposed in both formulations of the fixed horizon and the receding horizon cases.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Control and Systems Engineering
- Modelling and Simulation
- Control and Optimization