Dynamics, stability, and foresight in the Shapley-Scarf housing market

Yoshio Kamijo*, Ryo Kawasaki

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

3 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

While most of the literature starting with Shapley and Scarf (1974) have considered a static exchange economy with indivisibilities, this paper studies the dynamics of such an economy. We find that both the dynamics generated by competitive equilibrium and the one generated by the weak dominance relation, converge to a set of allocations we define as strictly stable, which we can show to exist. Moreover, we show that even when only pairwise exchanges between two traders are allowed, the strictly stable allocations are attained eventually if traders are sufficiently farsighted.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)214-222
ページ数9
ジャーナルJournal of Mathematical Economics
46
2
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2010 3月 20

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 経済学、計量経済学
  • 応用数学

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