Efficient secrecy: Public versus private threats in crisis diplomacy

研究成果: Article

70 引用 (Scopus)

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This paper explores when and why private communication works in crisis diplomacy. Conventional audience-cost models suggest that state leaders must go public with their threats in international crises because leaders cannot tie their hands if signals are issued privately. I present a crisis bargaining game where both the sender and the receiver of signals have a domestic audience. The equilibrium analysis demonstrates that a private threat, albeit of limited credibility, can be equally compelling as a fully credible public threat. The analysis suggests that secrecy works in crisis diplomacy despite its informational inefficacy. Secrecy insulates leaders from domestic political consequences when they capitulate to a challenge to avoid risking unwarranted war. The logic of efficient secrecy helps shed light on the unaccounted history of private diplomacy in international crises The Alaska Boundary Dispute illustrates this logic.

元の言語English
ページ(範囲)543-558
ページ数16
ジャーナルAmerican Political Science Review
101
発行部数3
DOI
出版物ステータスPublished - 2007 8 1
外部発表Yes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Political Science and International Relations

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