Electricity pricing and load dispatching in deregulated electricity market

[No Value] Geerli, S. Niioka, R. Yokoyama

    研究成果: Article

    3 引用 (Scopus)

    抄録

    A rapid move to a market-based electric power industry will significantly alter the structure of electricity pricing and system operation. In this paper, we consider a game of negotiation in the electricity market, involving electric utilities, independent power producers (IPPs) and large-scale customers. We analyze the two-level game strategies for the negotiation process between utilities, IPPs and customers. These have been previously recognized as a way to come up with a rational decision for competitive markets, in which players intend to maximize their own profits. The derived operation rules based on competition can be viewed as an extension of the conventional equal incremental cost method for the deregulated power system. The proposed approach was applied to several systems to verify its effectiveness.

    元の言語English
    ページ(範囲)491-498
    ページ数8
    ジャーナルInternational Journal of Electrical Power and Energy System
    25
    発行部数6
    DOI
    出版物ステータスPublished - 2003 7

    Fingerprint

    Electricity
    Electric utilities
    Costs
    Profitability
    Industry
    Power markets

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Energy Engineering and Power Technology
    • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

    これを引用

    Electricity pricing and load dispatching in deregulated electricity market. / Geerli, [No Value]; Niioka, S.; Yokoyama, R.

    :: International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy System, 巻 25, 番号 6, 07.2003, p. 491-498.

    研究成果: Article

    Geerli, [No Value] ; Niioka, S. ; Yokoyama, R. / Electricity pricing and load dispatching in deregulated electricity market. :: International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy System. 2003 ; 巻 25, 番号 6. pp. 491-498.
    @article{2942e7d28d514f3e95fc08dba652e2e6,
    title = "Electricity pricing and load dispatching in deregulated electricity market",
    abstract = "A rapid move to a market-based electric power industry will significantly alter the structure of electricity pricing and system operation. In this paper, we consider a game of negotiation in the electricity market, involving electric utilities, independent power producers (IPPs) and large-scale customers. We analyze the two-level game strategies for the negotiation process between utilities, IPPs and customers. These have been previously recognized as a way to come up with a rational decision for competitive markets, in which players intend to maximize their own profits. The derived operation rules based on competition can be viewed as an extension of the conventional equal incremental cost method for the deregulated power system. The proposed approach was applied to several systems to verify its effectiveness.",
    keywords = "Deregulation, Economical load distribution, Electricity price",
    author = "Geerli, {[No Value]} and S. Niioka and R. Yokoyama",
    year = "2003",
    month = "7",
    doi = "10.1016/S0142-0615(02)00012-1",
    language = "English",
    volume = "25",
    pages = "491--498",
    journal = "International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems",
    issn = "0142-0615",
    publisher = "Elsevier Limited",
    number = "6",

    }

    TY - JOUR

    T1 - Electricity pricing and load dispatching in deregulated electricity market

    AU - Geerli, [No Value]

    AU - Niioka, S.

    AU - Yokoyama, R.

    PY - 2003/7

    Y1 - 2003/7

    N2 - A rapid move to a market-based electric power industry will significantly alter the structure of electricity pricing and system operation. In this paper, we consider a game of negotiation in the electricity market, involving electric utilities, independent power producers (IPPs) and large-scale customers. We analyze the two-level game strategies for the negotiation process between utilities, IPPs and customers. These have been previously recognized as a way to come up with a rational decision for competitive markets, in which players intend to maximize their own profits. The derived operation rules based on competition can be viewed as an extension of the conventional equal incremental cost method for the deregulated power system. The proposed approach was applied to several systems to verify its effectiveness.

    AB - A rapid move to a market-based electric power industry will significantly alter the structure of electricity pricing and system operation. In this paper, we consider a game of negotiation in the electricity market, involving electric utilities, independent power producers (IPPs) and large-scale customers. We analyze the two-level game strategies for the negotiation process between utilities, IPPs and customers. These have been previously recognized as a way to come up with a rational decision for competitive markets, in which players intend to maximize their own profits. The derived operation rules based on competition can be viewed as an extension of the conventional equal incremental cost method for the deregulated power system. The proposed approach was applied to several systems to verify its effectiveness.

    KW - Deregulation

    KW - Economical load distribution

    KW - Electricity price

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0037411430&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0037411430&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    U2 - 10.1016/S0142-0615(02)00012-1

    DO - 10.1016/S0142-0615(02)00012-1

    M3 - Article

    AN - SCOPUS:0037411430

    VL - 25

    SP - 491

    EP - 498

    JO - International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems

    JF - International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems

    SN - 0142-0615

    IS - 6

    ER -