Eliciting information from a large population

Kohei Kawamura*

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

5 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

This paper studies information transmission in social surveys where a welfare maximizing decision maker communicates with a random sample of individuals from a large population who have heterogeneous preferences. The population distribution of preferences is unknown and has to be estimated, based on answers from the respondents. The decision maker cannot identify the true distribution of preferences even if the sample size becomes arbitrarily large, since the respondents have incentive to "exaggerate" their preferences especially as the sample size becomes larger and each respondent has weaker influence on the decision. The quality of communication with each respondent may improve as the sample size becomes smaller, and thus we identify the trade-off between the quality and quantity of communication. We show that the decision maker may prefer to sample a smaller number of individuals when the prior is weaker.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)44-54
ページ数11
ジャーナルJournal of Public Economics
103
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2013 7
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 財務
  • 経済学、計量経済学

フィンガープリント

「Eliciting information from a large population」の研究トピックを掘り下げます。これらがまとまってユニークなフィンガープリントを構成します。

引用スタイル