Equilibrium Seeking in Two-Agent Non-Cooperative Dynamic Game with Asymmetric Horizon Length

Taichi Tanaka, Yasuaki Wasa, Tomohisa Hayakawa

研究成果: Conference contribution

抄録

This paper investigates equilibrium and stability analysis in a two-agent non-cooperative dynamic game. Almost all existing papers handling finite-horizon dynamic games assume the common prediction horizon length, whereas this paper considers an asymmetric length case due to differences in personal values. We thus propose two possible control strategies without the knowledge of the other agent's horizon information through a linear-quadratic game. One of the proposed control strategies is the receding horizon control based on an open-loop Nash equilibrium with the common horizon case. The other is an iterative optimization-based control with each agent estimating the other's feedback gain from the state information. We also discuss the effectiveness of the proposed strategies and the stability condition of the corresponding closed-loop systems through numerical examples.

本文言語English
ホスト出版物のタイトルASCC 2022 - 2022 13th Asian Control Conference, Proceedings
出版社Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ページ2286-2291
ページ数6
ISBN(電子版)9788993215236
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2022
イベント13th Asian Control Conference, ASCC 2022 - Jeju, Korea, Republic of
継続期間: 2022 5月 42022 5月 7

出版物シリーズ

名前ASCC 2022 - 2022 13th Asian Control Conference, Proceedings

Conference

Conference13th Asian Control Conference, ASCC 2022
国/地域Korea, Republic of
CityJeju
Period22/5/422/5/7

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 制御およびシステム工学
  • 制御と最適化

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