Equity and the Vickrey allocation rule on general preference domains

Tsuyoshi Adachi*

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

7 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

We consider the problem of allocating multiple units of an indivisible good among a group of agents in which each agent demands at most one unit of the good and money payment or receipt is required. Under general preference domains that may contain non quasi-linear preferences, the Vickrey allocation rule is characterized by axioms for equity and continuity without use of efficiency: namely, the Vickrey rule is the only rule that satisfies strategy-proofness, weak envy-freeness for equals, non-imposition, and continuity of welfare.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)813-830
ページ数18
ジャーナルSocial Choice and Welfare
42
4
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2014 7 7

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 社会科学(その他)
  • 経済学、計量経済学

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