TY - JOUR
T1 - Equity and the Vickrey allocation rule on general preference domains
AU - Adachi, Tsuyoshi
PY - 2014/7/7
Y1 - 2014/7/7
N2 - We consider the problem of allocating multiple units of an indivisible good among a group of agents in which each agent demands at most one unit of the good and money payment or receipt is required. Under general preference domains that may contain non quasi-linear preferences, the Vickrey allocation rule is characterized by axioms for equity and continuity without use of efficiency: namely, the Vickrey rule is the only rule that satisfies strategy-proofness, weak envy-freeness for equals, non-imposition, and continuity of welfare.
AB - We consider the problem of allocating multiple units of an indivisible good among a group of agents in which each agent demands at most one unit of the good and money payment or receipt is required. Under general preference domains that may contain non quasi-linear preferences, the Vickrey allocation rule is characterized by axioms for equity and continuity without use of efficiency: namely, the Vickrey rule is the only rule that satisfies strategy-proofness, weak envy-freeness for equals, non-imposition, and continuity of welfare.
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U2 - 10.1007/s00355-013-0752-0
DO - 10.1007/s00355-013-0752-0
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85027939136
VL - 42
SP - 813
EP - 830
JO - Social Choice and Welfare
JF - Social Choice and Welfare
SN - 0176-1714
IS - 4
ER -