Evolution of cooperation driven by zealots

Naoki Masuda*

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

30 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

Recent experimental results with humans involved in social dilemma games suggest that cooperation may be a contagious phenomenon and that the selection pressure operating on evolutionary dynamics (i.e., mimicry) is relatively weak. I propose an evolutionary dynamics model that links these experimental findings and evolution of cooperation. By assuming a small fraction of (imperfect) zealous cooperators, I show that a large fraction of cooperation emerges in evolutionary dynamics of social dilemma games. Even if defection is more lucrative than cooperation for most individuals, they often mimic cooperation of fellows unless the selection pressure is very strong. Then, zealous cooperators can transform the population to be even fully cooperative under standard evolutionary dynamics.

本文言語English
論文番号646
ジャーナルScientific reports
2
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2012
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 一般

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