TY - GEN
T1 - Evolution of cooperation in meta-rewards games on networks of WS and BA models
AU - Hirahara, Yuki
AU - Toriumi, Fujio
AU - Sugawara, Toshiharu
N1 - Copyright:
Copyright 2014 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2013
Y1 - 2013
N2 - We investigated the required conditions in which cooperation is dominant in social media using the model of a meta-rewards game, which is a dual part of Axelrod's metanorms game. Social media such as Twitter and Facebook have rapidly been growing in recent years. However, we do not know whether or not the currently popular social media will remain in the future. A number of studies have been conducted to try to understand the conditions or mechanisms that create and keep social media thriving using a public goods game and/or meta-rewards games, in which situations where many users post articles and respond to them as reactions in social media correspond to situations where cooperation is dominant in these games. However, they assume that agent networks in social media are complete graphs that are known to be dissimilar to actual social networks. We examined the conditions required to keep agent networks thriving based on Watts and Strogatz (WS) and Barabasi-Albert (BA) models, which are more similar to actual social networks. We experimentally found similarities and differences in the conditions for cooperation-dominant situations between networks based on complete graphs and those based on WS and BA models. Our results indicated that it was easier to maintain cooperation-dominant situations in BA-model networks than in other networks.
AB - We investigated the required conditions in which cooperation is dominant in social media using the model of a meta-rewards game, which is a dual part of Axelrod's metanorms game. Social media such as Twitter and Facebook have rapidly been growing in recent years. However, we do not know whether or not the currently popular social media will remain in the future. A number of studies have been conducted to try to understand the conditions or mechanisms that create and keep social media thriving using a public goods game and/or meta-rewards games, in which situations where many users post articles and respond to them as reactions in social media correspond to situations where cooperation is dominant in these games. However, they assume that agent networks in social media are complete graphs that are known to be dissimilar to actual social networks. We examined the conditions required to keep agent networks thriving based on Watts and Strogatz (WS) and Barabasi-Albert (BA) models, which are more similar to actual social networks. We experimentally found similarities and differences in the conditions for cooperation-dominant situations between networks based on complete graphs and those based on WS and BA models. Our results indicated that it was easier to maintain cooperation-dominant situations in BA-model networks than in other networks.
KW - Agent-based simulation
KW - Complex network
KW - Metanorms game
KW - Prisoners' dilemma
KW - Social media
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U2 - 10.1109/WI-IAT.2013.165
DO - 10.1109/WI-IAT.2013.165
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84893238795
SN - 9781479929023
T3 - Proceedings - 2013 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Workshops, WI-IATW 2013
SP - 126
EP - 130
BT - Proceedings - 2013 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Workshops, WI-IATW 2013
T2 - 2013 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology Workshops, WI-IATW 2013
Y2 - 17 November 2013 through 20 November 2013
ER -