Evolution of cooperation in SNS-norms game on complex networks and real social networks

Yuki Hirahara, Fujio Toriumi, Toshiharu Sugawara

    研究成果: Conference contribution

    7 引用 (Scopus)

    抄録

    Social networking services (SNSs) such as Facebook and Google+ are indispensable social media for a variety of social communications, but we do not yet fully understand whether these currently popular social media will remain in the future. A number of studies have attempted to understand the mechanisms that keep social media thriving by using a meta-rewards game that is the dual form of a public goods game. However, the meta-rewards game does not take into account the unique characteristics of current SNSs. Hence, in this work we propose an SNS-norms game that is an extension of Axelrod’s metanorms game, similar to meta-rewards games, but that considers the cost of commenting on an article and who is most likely to respond to it. We then experimentally investigated the conditions for a cooperation-dominant situation in which many users continuing to post articles. Our results indicate that relatively large rewards compared to the cost of posting articles and comments are required, but optional responses with lower cost, such as “Like!” buttons, play an important role in cooperation dominance. This phenomenon is of interest because it is quite different from those shown in previous studies using meta-rewards games.

    元の言語English
    ホスト出版物のタイトルLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
    出版者Springer Verlag
    ページ112-120
    ページ数9
    8851
    ISBN(印刷物)9783319137339
    出版物ステータスPublished - 2014
    イベント6th International Conference on Social Informatics, SocInfo 2014 - Barcelona
    継続期間: 2014 11 112014 11 13

    出版物シリーズ

    名前Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
    8851
    ISSN(印刷物)03029743
    ISSN(電子版)16113349

    Other

    Other6th International Conference on Social Informatics, SocInfo 2014
    Barcelona
    期間14/11/1114/11/13

    Fingerprint

    Evolution of Cooperation
    Social Networking
    Complex networks
    Complex Networks
    Social Networks
    Reward
    Game
    Norm
    Social Media
    Costs
    Communication
    Likely

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Computer Science(all)
    • Theoretical Computer Science

    これを引用

    Hirahara, Y., Toriumi, F., & Sugawara, T. (2014). Evolution of cooperation in SNS-norms game on complex networks and real social networks. : Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (巻 8851, pp. 112-120). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); 巻数 8851). Springer Verlag.

    Evolution of cooperation in SNS-norms game on complex networks and real social networks. / Hirahara, Yuki; Toriumi, Fujio; Sugawara, Toshiharu.

    Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics). 巻 8851 Springer Verlag, 2014. p. 112-120 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); 巻 8851).

    研究成果: Conference contribution

    Hirahara, Y, Toriumi, F & Sugawara, T 2014, Evolution of cooperation in SNS-norms game on complex networks and real social networks. : Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics). 巻. 8851, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), 巻. 8851, Springer Verlag, pp. 112-120, 6th International Conference on Social Informatics, SocInfo 2014, Barcelona, 14/11/11.
    Hirahara Y, Toriumi F, Sugawara T. Evolution of cooperation in SNS-norms game on complex networks and real social networks. : Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics). 巻 8851. Springer Verlag. 2014. p. 112-120. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).
    Hirahara, Yuki ; Toriumi, Fujio ; Sugawara, Toshiharu. / Evolution of cooperation in SNS-norms game on complex networks and real social networks. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics). 巻 8851 Springer Verlag, 2014. pp. 112-120 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).
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    abstract = "Social networking services (SNSs) such as Facebook and Google+ are indispensable social media for a variety of social communications, but we do not yet fully understand whether these currently popular social media will remain in the future. A number of studies have attempted to understand the mechanisms that keep social media thriving by using a meta-rewards game that is the dual form of a public goods game. However, the meta-rewards game does not take into account the unique characteristics of current SNSs. Hence, in this work we propose an SNS-norms game that is an extension of Axelrod’s metanorms game, similar to meta-rewards games, but that considers the cost of commenting on an article and who is most likely to respond to it. We then experimentally investigated the conditions for a cooperation-dominant situation in which many users continuing to post articles. Our results indicate that relatively large rewards compared to the cost of posting articles and comments are required, but optional responses with lower cost, such as “Like!” buttons, play an important role in cooperation dominance. This phenomenon is of interest because it is quite different from those shown in previous studies using meta-rewards games.",
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