Farsighted Coalitional Stability Of A Price Leadership Cartel

Yoshio Kamijo*, Shigeo Muto

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

6 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

This paper analyzes the farsighted behaviour of firms that form a dominant price leadership cartel. We consider stability concepts such as the farsighted core, the farsighted stable sets, and the largest consistent set. We show that: (i) the farsighted core is either an empty set or a singleton set of the grand cartel; (ii) any Pareto efficient cartel is itself a farsighted stable set; and (iii) the set of cartels in which fringe firms enjoy higher profits than the firms in the minimal Pareto efficient cartel is the largest consistent set.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)455-465
ページ数11
ジャーナルJapanese Economic Review
61
4
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2010 12月

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 経済学、計量経済学

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