抄録
This paper demonstrates the strategies of governments to influence the adoption of technology among firms. Technological advances offer new paradigms for development. However, developing countries are still behind to fully take advantages of these improvements due to adoption of technology problem. The government's low efficiency delays investment in latest technologies that require greater experience and investment on the part of firms when undertaking technology adoption decisions. Backward induction game model is constructed subject to preferential policy of technology adoption. The game consists of two players, government and firms. The paper finds the Nash equilibrium of the game under the specific three strategies of the government. A real case example of Pakistan's telecommunications sector is taken to demonstrate this approach. The result shows that government decisions are significant, which lead to different strategic behaviours of firms in the technology adoption game.
| 元の言語 | English |
|---|---|
| ページ（範囲） | 287-303 |
| ページ数 | 17 |
| ジャーナル | International Journal of Technology, Policy and Management |
| 巻 | 14 |
| 発行部数 | 3 |
| DOI | |
| 出版物ステータス | Published - 2014 |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Engineering(all)
- Business, Management and Accounting(all)
これを引用
Game theoretical approach for technology adoption and government strategic decisions. / Saleem, Ayesha; Higuchi, Kiyohide.
：: International Journal of Technology, Policy and Management, 巻 14, 番号 3, 2014, p. 287-303.研究成果: Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Game theoretical approach for technology adoption and government strategic decisions
AU - Saleem, Ayesha
AU - Higuchi, Kiyohide
PY - 2014
Y1 - 2014
N2 - This paper demonstrates the strategies of governments to influence the adoption of technology among firms. Technological advances offer new paradigms for development. However, developing countries are still behind to fully take advantages of these improvements due to adoption of technology problem. The government's low efficiency delays investment in latest technologies that require greater experience and investment on the part of firms when undertaking technology adoption decisions. Backward induction game model is constructed subject to preferential policy of technology adoption. The game consists of two players, government and firms. The paper finds the Nash equilibrium of the game under the specific three strategies of the government. A real case example of Pakistan's telecommunications sector is taken to demonstrate this approach. The result shows that government decisions are significant, which lead to different strategic behaviours of firms in the technology adoption game.
AB - This paper demonstrates the strategies of governments to influence the adoption of technology among firms. Technological advances offer new paradigms for development. However, developing countries are still behind to fully take advantages of these improvements due to adoption of technology problem. The government's low efficiency delays investment in latest technologies that require greater experience and investment on the part of firms when undertaking technology adoption decisions. Backward induction game model is constructed subject to preferential policy of technology adoption. The game consists of two players, government and firms. The paper finds the Nash equilibrium of the game under the specific three strategies of the government. A real case example of Pakistan's telecommunications sector is taken to demonstrate this approach. The result shows that government decisions are significant, which lead to different strategic behaviours of firms in the technology adoption game.
KW - Backward induction
KW - Developing countries
KW - Firms
KW - Game theory
KW - Government strategies
KW - Technology adoption
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84903696029&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84903696029&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1504/IJTPM.2014.062952
DO - 10.1504/IJTPM.2014.062952
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84903696029
VL - 14
SP - 287
EP - 303
JO - International Journal of Technology, Policy and Management
JF - International Journal of Technology, Policy and Management
SN - 1468-4322
IS - 3
ER -