Game theory application to pricing structure of market-based power system

[No Value] Geerli, Ryuichi Yokoyama, David K. Murage, Luonan Chen

    研究成果: Chapter

    3 引用 (Scopus)

    抄録

    Electricity markets are experiencing widespread changes that are significantly altering the Industry. In this paper we consider economic load dispatching rules in power systems under competitive environment when independent power producers (IPPs) are introduced and analyze their economic consequences by using game theory. An electric utility and IPP are included in the model as players of the game. We consider an extensive game model of electricity market where IPP enter into the game, firstly as a group and secondly when each IPPs enters into the game individually. Utility and IPPs intend to maximize their own profit. The prices between the electric utility and IPP are determined such that they are Nash equilibrium points. In this paper, we employ the Nash equilibrium solution method to analyze negotiation processes between utility and IPPs since it is widely recognized as a rational decision for competitive markets in terms of axiom. It is shown in this paper, that all obtained simulation results can be viewed as an extension of the equalizing incremental cost from regulated power systems to competitive power markets.

    元の言語English
    ホスト出版物のタイトルProceedings of the Universities Power Engineering Conference
    出版場所Iraklio, Greece
    出版者Technological Educational Institute
    ページ652-655
    ページ数4
    2
    出版物ステータスPublished - 1999
    イベントProceedings of the 1999 34th Universities Power Engineering Conference - UPEC '99 - Leicester, UK
    継続期間: 1999 9 141999 9 16

    Other

    OtherProceedings of the 1999 34th Universities Power Engineering Conference - UPEC '99
    Leicester, UK
    期間99/9/1499/9/16

    Fingerprint

    Game theory
    Electric utilities
    Costs
    Economics
    Profitability
    Power markets
    Industry

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Energy(all)
    • Engineering(all)

    これを引用

    Geerli, N. V., Yokoyama, R., Murage, D. K., & Chen, L. (1999). Game theory application to pricing structure of market-based power system. : Proceedings of the Universities Power Engineering Conference (巻 2, pp. 652-655). Iraklio, Greece: Technological Educational Institute.

    Game theory application to pricing structure of market-based power system. / Geerli, [No Value]; Yokoyama, Ryuichi; Murage, David K.; Chen, Luonan.

    Proceedings of the Universities Power Engineering Conference. 巻 2 Iraklio, Greece : Technological Educational Institute, 1999. p. 652-655.

    研究成果: Chapter

    Geerli, NV, Yokoyama, R, Murage, DK & Chen, L 1999, Game theory application to pricing structure of market-based power system. : Proceedings of the Universities Power Engineering Conference. 巻. 2, Technological Educational Institute, Iraklio, Greece, pp. 652-655, Proceedings of the 1999 34th Universities Power Engineering Conference - UPEC '99, Leicester, UK, 99/9/14.
    Geerli NV, Yokoyama R, Murage DK, Chen L. Game theory application to pricing structure of market-based power system. : Proceedings of the Universities Power Engineering Conference. 巻 2. Iraklio, Greece: Technological Educational Institute. 1999. p. 652-655
    Geerli, [No Value] ; Yokoyama, Ryuichi ; Murage, David K. ; Chen, Luonan. / Game theory application to pricing structure of market-based power system. Proceedings of the Universities Power Engineering Conference. 巻 2 Iraklio, Greece : Technological Educational Institute, 1999. pp. 652-655
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