Games for security under adaptive adversaries

Timos Antonopoulos, Tachio Terauchi

研究成果: Conference contribution

1 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

This work explores methods for proving and disproving security of systems under adaptive adversaries. Adaptive adversaries are ones which make their next move based on the previous observations. Our first contribution is a new game based characterization of security. We show that the game accurately captures security of deterministic and probabilistic systems against adaptive (probabilistic) adversaries. In addition, we build on top of the game characterization and present techniques that expedite proving the existence of attacker and defender strategies, and consequently proving security or vulnerability of systems. The first is what we call attack (and defense) slopes which give simple sufficient criteria for existence of winning strategies (for attacker and defender). The second is reductions of one game to another achieved by mapping a strategy of one to that of the other. We show that such reductions can prove or disprove security by reducing from a game of a secure system or reducing to that of a non-secure system.

本文言語English
ホスト出版物のタイトルProceedings - 2019 IEEE 32nd Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2019
出版社IEEE Computer Society
ページ216-229
ページ数14
ISBN(電子版)9781728114064
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2019 6
イベント32nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2019 - Hoboken, United States
継続期間: 2019 6 252019 6 28

出版物シリーズ

名前Proceedings - IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
2019-June
ISSN(印刷版)1940-1434

Conference

Conference32nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2019
国/地域United States
CityHoboken
Period19/6/2519/6/28

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 工学(全般)

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