Imperfect competition in financial markets and capital structure

Sergei Guriev*, Dmitriy Kvasov

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

5 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

We consider a model of corporate finance with imperfectly competitive financial intermediaries. Firms can finance projects either via debt or via equity. Because of asymmetric information about firms' growth opportunities, equity financing involves a dilution cost. Nevertheless, equity emerges in equilibrium whenever financial intermediaries have sufficient market power. In the latter case, best firms issue debt while the less profitable firms are equity-financed. We also show that strategic interaction between oligopolistic intermediaries results in multiple equilibria. If one intermediary chooses to buy more debt, the price of debt decreases, so the best equity-issuing firms switch from equity to debt financing. This in turn decreases average quality of equity-financed pool, so other intermediaries also shift towards more debt.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)131-146
ページ数16
ジャーナルJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
72
1
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2009 10
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 経済学、計量経済学
  • 組織的行動および人的資源管理

フィンガープリント

「Imperfect competition in financial markets and capital structure」の研究トピックを掘り下げます。これらがまとまってユニークなフィンガープリントを構成します。

引用スタイル