Implementation and axiomatization of discounted Shapley values

René van den Brink*, Yukihiko Funaki

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

19 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

In this paper we introduce discounting in the bidding mechanism of Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (J Econ Theory 100:274–294, 2001) who implemented the Shapley value for cooperative transferable utility games. This modification of the mechanism yields the corresponding discounted Shapley value as the payoff distribution in every subgame perfect equilibrium. The class of discounted Shapley values contains the Shapley value and equal division solution as its extreme cases. Interestingly, we obtain axiomatizations of each solution in this class by generalizing the null player property (of the Shapley value) and nullifying player property (of the equal division solution) to the so-called δ-reducing player property.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)329-344
ページ数16
ジャーナルSocial Choice and Welfare
45
2
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2015 9月 24

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 社会科学(その他)
  • 経済学、計量経済学

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