Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment

Haris Aziz, Yoichi Kasajima

研究成果: Article査読

7 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

We consider the problem of assigning objects probabilistically among a group of agents who may have multi-unit demands. Each agent has linear preferences over the (set of) objects. The most commonly used extension of preferences to compare probabilistic assignments is by means of stochastic dominance, which leads to corresponding notions of envy-freeness, efficiency, and strategy-proofness. We show that equal treatment of equals, efficiency, and strategy-proofness are incompatible. Moreover, anonymity, neutrality, efficiency, and weak strategy-proofness are incompatible. If we strengthen weak strategy-proofness to weak group strategy-proofness, then when agents have single-unit demands, anonymity, neutrality, efficiency, and weak group strategy-proofness become incompatible.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)255-275
ページ数21
ジャーナルSocial Choice and Welfare
49
2
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2017 8 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 社会科学(その他)
  • 経済学、計量経済学

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